

The Future of the European Union: A European Union Proposal for the Second Half of the 21st Century and Turkey's Contribution

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Abstract

Despite some certain changes in the decision-making mechanisms and organization of the EU after the Treaty of Lisbon, a desired structure aiming to provide solutions to the EU's obstinate problems, with its deepest recession in 2009 since the 1930s, could not be brought about. The only gain from the Treaty of Lisbon was to postpone dealing with those problems for a later date. The debt crisis in Greece, an EU member for thirty years, showed that the EU had no protective mechanisms to prevent such economic crises or no recovery mechanisms to get rid of the effects of those problems. All these, including the suffering some EU members (i.e. Portugal and Spain) experienced, indicate that there is a need in the EU for broader and intensive changes, but not like those superficial ones, which were made with the Lisbon Treaty. This transformation process would have extensive effects on the EU accession talks with Turkey. This essay puts forward a new forms of the EU by taking into account Greece's fiscal crisis and what has been done with the Lisbon Treaty, goes through almost all scenarios developed before, and reconsiders the transformation process of the EU until 2050's, and tries to specify the position and limits of Turkey, starting with the talks with EU in 2005.

Key Words: European Union, Lisbon Treaty, Turkey's Accession, Economic Crisis, Energy Security.

Introduction

After the first decade of the new millennium, some problems crystallized into the global crisis that damaged the world economy, especially the Western economies. Despite some certain changes in the decision-making mechanisms and organization after the Treaty of Lisbon entered into force on December 1, 2009, the European Union (EU) decision makers could not set up a structure that could cope with the EU's global and obstinate problems. It can be considered an illusion that the EU overcame the issues arising from the crisis after the EU Constitution was rejected,

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but in reality, the only benefit obtained from the Treaty of Lisbon was that it postponed dealing with obstinate issues for a later date (Dougan, 2008: 636). Under the pressure of merciless competition, the EU has to work out not only internal problems but also external ones that are generated from global actors and other developments.

The economic triumph, regarded as the most successful of all EU efforts in more than 50 years of its existence, which has been restructured along neoliberal lines since the mid-1980s (Bieler, 2009: 118), led an adaptation to the EU as an economic giant. It is quite different from current circumstances since the incident. Greece, an EU member for thirty years, has experienced a budget crisis so severe that its deficit is four times the EU limit. People fear that the budget crisis could potentially spread to Spain and Portugal, which have been EU members for 25 years. All these are indicators that the EU had no mechanisms to prevent such economic and monetary crises, let alone recover from the effects of the crisis.

The impact of global developments and existing global financial and economic crisis indicate that the EU would need an imperative change. This change should be broad and intensive, not like superficial changes that resulted from the Lisbon Treaty. Continuing the status quo in the future can cause blood loss and at the end, the EU would change into a simple international organization that addresses economic and social problems as a regional power. EU members and decision makers would try to survive and make every effort to prevent it from happening. Therefore, the transformation of the EU seems inevitable.

Turkey was admitted to EEC in 1959 and its government policy seeks to join the EU but a big majority of the Turkish people think that their country will never be a full member, even if it fulfils the accession criteria (Şenyuva, 2009: 35). The dynamics within the EU have certain effects also on the Turkish people who have been waiting at Europe's door for more than 50 years. After the crisis broke out in the neighbouring country, Turkish people, who have been already desperate to get full membership, began to reconsider the meaning of full EU membership. Unlike the Greek people, the Turks were deprived of EU membership instruments, and yet managed to overcome the global crisis without any help from any international institutions like the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

In this study, reconsidering almost all models developed before, a new form of the EU has been put forward in advance and we tried to specify the position of Turkey, after getting full membership, having the potential to contribute to chronic issues, in this unique EU structure.

I. The Coercive Factors and the Determining components of the EU's Transformation

It can be accepted that there are several compelling factors that make the EU's transformation possible. Putting forth the transformation process of the EU for consideration in a comprehensive way, the coercive factors and the determining components of the EU's transformation are discussed below.

A. The Coercive Factors of the EU's Transformation

In this section we will describe the conditions that force the EU to transform its structural and institutional system.

1. Ineffectiveness of the EU as a Global Actor in the International System

Thus far, the EU has been facing big losses because of the lack of common will to use its existing potential. Whenever (and also wherever) the EU has not been able to provide a decision at the EU level, the leaders of some dominant members (currently Germany and France, formerly and sometimes the United Kingdom and Italy) decide what to do in the name of all EU members and institutions. Due to the small size of member states and their "*markedly Atlanticist orientation, the new Member States have tipped the internal balance of the EU in that direction*" (Blockmans and Wessel, 2009: 26). In this case, member countries, except for the dominant ones, have nothing to do but obey what two leaders decide. Perhaps the most distinctive example of the EU's lack of a common political will is that, despite Germany and France and the EU Commission's attitudes (Gordon, 2002: 3), the United States-led

coalition, composed of some 40 countries also included 14 EU members.² Another example could be the frustrated application of the EU's *soft power*³ to settle the nuclear disputes of Iran and North Korea with the United States; or a normative power as Manners (2002: 236) mentioned, which serves democracy and human rights norms for the rest of the world. Because the EU, at community level, could not become involved in the struggle between the United States and Russia, some countries tried to do something in other situations. For example, soon after Central Asian Republics' independence, some EU countries (i.e. Germany in Kazakhstan) tried to do something that was not at the EU level but state level. It is possible to give more examples but the main point is that the lack of common political will causes some losses for which the EU cannot compensate. Leaders and other decision makers of the EU have been aware of that. But as of today there is nothing to do because two EU bodies,⁴ which were created as a result of the changes made by the Treaty of Lisbon, are far from providing the desired contribution to EU's political decision making mechanism.

2. The Worsening Economic and Social Conditions of the EU Members

The first factors, among the other ones forcing the EU to transform, are the deteriorating monetary and social problems of member countries crystallized into the global crisis despite many efforts at community level for many years. The whole continent has been dealing with the high cost of living since the euro. What is currently happening in Greece bears some resemblance to the effect of Nye's (1970: 800) theory of spill back. This is caused because of the expectations of European citizens who have greater state and social systems than others all over the world and

²UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Denmark, Portugal Spain, Bulgaria, Estonia, Denmark, Czech Republic, Latvia, Poland, Slovakia, Lithuania and Hungary.

³The term of soft power was first used by Nye (Nye,1990). Also he revised the concept as "The soft power of a country rests primarily on three resources: its culture (in places where it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral authority)" in an interview that was given to the Journal of Foreign Policy by Nye in 2006 (Nye: http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=3393).

⁴The Presidency of the European Council: is established by the Treaty of Lisbon. The President is to serve one 2, 5-year term. Former PM of Belgium Herman Van Rompuy is appointed as the first President. The system of six-month presidency rotation is over now. The European Union's High Representative for Foreign Affairs & Security Policy: it is created in order to increase the effectiveness of foreign policy. The EU's former Trade Commissioner, Briton Catherina Ashton, has been appointed. Ashton now speaks in the name of 27 members of the EU at the international level.

do not share similar histories of struggle and institutional change (Herman, 2007: 61). Now there has been a threat that the economic crisis of Greece, not only confined to Greece,⁵ would also threaten the entire euro zone, which has an incomplete governance problem (Pisani-Feeri, 2009: 11).

It can be stated that the EU does not have enough economic instruments that are needed to overcome some potential monetary problems in Spain, Portugal⁶ and maybe more member countries like Ireland and Romania. While focusing on some suffering countries such as Greece, Spain and Portugal, some crucial points are missing and an illusion occurs that everything in the EU is worsening day by day because of the economy. The first thing we neglect is that some dominant countries, like Germany, France and United Kingdom, which are greater than the other members in terms of size, almost do not suffer during global crises and even earn more than before. What this means is that there is an asymmetry in the economic power of the EU member countries following the crisis. The result is that there is a mergence with the decision-making mechanism and almost all crucial decisions are made with consensus reached between two dominant countries: Germany and France. The only way to put this consensus in practice is to find a feasible road in the *acquis communautaire*. In other words, equality becomes a reality as more members are given equal status. That almost all South American countries owe to three EU dominant countries (Tilford and White, 2010: 7), namely Germany, French and UK, is one of the most important indicators that economic problems suffered by some EU members do not include all EU members.

⁵The euro is about to face its first serious test, and that the stability of the euro zone cannot be taken for granted. (Tilford, 2009: http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/essay_10_euro_7jan09.pdf).

⁶During the accession negotiations with Spain and (to a lesser extent) Portugal and Greece, for instance, there was frequent talk of the danger of massive migration flows from South to North as a result of the full membership of these countries. In the case of the entry of Spain and Portugal on 1 January 1986, this fear was fueled by the simultaneous decision to complete the Internal Market, including the free movement of persons (Holman, 2004). Now, almost three decades later, we witness that not this ‘threat’ but some different factors pose a threat to the economic prestige of the EU.

B. The Components Determining the EU's Transformation

In an international system of anarchic nature, where all dynamics change in a perpetual manner, certain components, highly possible to occur, will force the EU to transform. These components are given below:

1. Perpetuation of Military and Political Conflict in Energy-Intensive Areas

With the discovery of the internal combustion engine and oil becoming the dominant energy source, this commodity has also become the main reason of almost all global conflicts since the 1900's. Between the end of the 1960s and the oil price hike of 1973, at that time, oil prices had become volatile after decades of stable and low prices (Parvizi and Houweling, 2003: 521). The fact that the more the industrialization level increases, the more energy dependence accelerates, has as a result the increasing importance of oil and the difficulty of securing a stable supply of energy. Consequently, energy issues have taken the first place among the issues affecting global developments. While moving into the new millennium, it was foreseen that oil and natural gas would maintain over 60 % share in the global energy market and there would not be any cost-effective alternative energy source in the next 75-80 years in the commercial sense. Therefore, an increase in political and military conflicts can be expected in energy regions rich in fossil resources (except coal) with strategic features. Energy security moved to the top of the American agenda after the 1960s. In a unipolar global political system, the United States military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq, which could not find a solution to its energy supply for nearly 50 years, supports this prediction. One of the effects of the United States military intervention on the EU is the emerging inadequacy of the existing administrative structure and decision-making mechanism in case of any possible conflict of interest with the United States. To the EU decision makers, aware of this deficiency, the fulfilment of Turkey's membership seems to be a solution. Correl and van der Linde mentioned that the Wider Europe policy of the EU (ENP) was created because of the continuity problem of the EU's oil demand (Correl and van der Linde, 2006: 540). Turkey as a country situated on energy lines becomes more important in this regard. In this sense, though the fulfilment of Turkey's membership probably does not balance the EU with the United States, it will certainly be able to make the EU more effective in the global sense.

2. The EU's Increasing Sensitivity to the Energy Supply Security

The energy dependence (European Commission, 2003: 44 and 111) of the members has been increasing every year. Almost all of them are dependent on imported oil and natural gas. Europe's dependence on imported oil is set to grow from a current 52% to 85% in 2030, and for gas from 36% to about 63%. The gradually increasing dependence on energy imports will increase the EU's sensitivity to ensure the security of energy supply and may force it to review its current energy policies. Energy policy tools,⁷ developed in the context of EU energy policy, have not been sufficient to achieve the expected goals. Because of the reservations regarding the sovereign rights of member countries, current EU energy policy could not reach the level of other common successful EU policies. The efforts⁸ of some members to develop alternative energy sources on their own are still quite far from being a solution to problem of dependency on energy imports. Fulfilment of Turkey's membership has crucial importance for ensuring the EU's security of energy supply. Energy transported through pipelines, Blue stream⁹ Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC)¹⁰ will

⁷On behalf of achieving the community energy policy objectives, the EU has been applied for many energy policies namely some *Joule, Altener, Save, Sinerji, Carnot, Etap, Sure, Thermie, Valoren, Tacis, Tracea, Inogate, Bistro Echo*. Some were completed and some others are, with same or different name, still applying. For details of common energy policies, look at: Energy Secure and sustainable supplies (EU official web site: http://europa.eu/pol/ener/index_en.htm).

⁸Danish wind energy in electricity production (close to 15 % rate) makes it the world leader. But this success is not enough to compensate the import dependency. Because Denmark is expected to consume three times more than it produces in three decades. Similar to Denmark, Germany is expected to consume six times more than it produces. For covering this inefficiency, what Germans did for wind energy is not also enough. France, a world leader in producing electricity with nuclear power, can not close the energy gap.

⁹Blue Stream gas pipeline from Russia snakes along the bottom of the Black Sea and resurfaces in the Turkish port of Samsun. Opened in 2003, Blue Stream was due to deliver 10 billion cubic meters of gas in 2007, with its full capacity of 16 billion cubic meters scheduled to be reached in 2010. Russia has been exploring the option of doubling Blue Stream's capacity, to 32 billion cubic meters a year, with the aim of selling the gas to Europe, and perhaps forestalling the Nabucco pipeline through which the Europeans want to import Caspian, Central Asian and perhaps one day Iranian gas without crossing Russian territory.

¹⁰BTC for Caspian oil and gas: Turkey's profile as an energy hub rose considerably with the opening of the BTC oil pipeline in May 2006. The US had been pushing hard for BTC, as the first pipeline specifically designed to export Caspian oil without going through Russia. BTC can transport 1 million barrels of oil a day from Azerbaijan via Georgia to the Turkish port of Ceyhan. Alongside BTC runs the Baku-Tbilisi-Erzurum (or South Caucasus) gas pipeline through which Turkey imports gas from Azerbaijan.

contribute to the realization of Turkey's full membership. Increasing the scale of the EU energy market after Turkey's membership will provide advantages to the EU.

3. *Major Projects will be Completed before Turkey's Membership and Turkey will Become an Energy Hub*

Turkey, between energy-intensive regions and the European continent, seems to be an energy hub through its energy strategies, aiming to get benefits of this unique strategic position. In the case of the implementation of the Nabucco Project¹¹, as designed to carry the Turkmen and Iranian gas to the Eastern Europe Ring, it will further increase the importance of Turkey to the EU. Otherwise, in case of a failure to implement the project, the sensibility of the energy supply security for the EU will increase. Turkey's energy projects will be completed when Turkey will have finished negotiations with the EU and will have received full member status. Having completed these energy projects, Turkey will be a vitally important actor to the EU because it will be a more reliable supplier than Russia. Turkey strives to diversify its foreign policy alternatives in order to strengthen its position in the centre of being an energy hub until the mid 2000's.

4. *Russia, Keeping on the Mission of the EU's Main Energy Supplier*

Russia has been perceived by Europe, during the Second World War, as a country that saved Europe from Germany; during the post-war era as an intruder country by not withdrawing from Eastern Europe and presenting a communist threat; and finally after the Berlin wall collapsed, as a vital energy supplier. During the disintegration process of the USSR in the early 1990s, although the EU tried to break into the field of Russian influence; Russia, with Vladimir Putin's charismatic leadership and thanks to rising oil income, returned again as a strong player on the chessboard. Russian gains in the war in Georgia and the election results in Ukraine can be considered as the most obvious evidences of that return. As a result of this

¹¹The EU needs alternatives for energy security without relying on Russia. Nabucco project, that could make positive effect to Europe's energy security and make Turkey a real energy hub, will have 3,300-kilometer pipeline, which runs from eastern Turkey into Austria. It is the first small step of the Turkey-Greece interconnector. After getting its full capacity, 31 billion cubic meters of gas could be transported to the EU every year. The potential start of construction has already been pushed back from 2007 to 2009. And even in the best-case scenario, gas will not start flowing before 2014.

strong challenge, the EU has chosen cooperation rather than competition. Today cooperation with the EU is very important to Russia as one of the most important actors in the global energy market, with rich natural gas reserves, aiming to raise its production to 9,5 million barrels a day.

5. The Attitude of Global Actors

Maintaining a hegemonic role in all aspects is closely related to energy for the United States (Cafruny, 2006: 3), a dominant actor of the international political system that began to carry unipolar structure characteristics. Maybe the main reason for using military force to keep under control more energy-intensive areas, the United States, one of the major oil producers, is that the amount of its oil production can not meet its consumption. The United States military intervention seems to affect relations with the EU. Besides the United States, global players, such as Japan, China, and India have also increased their energy dependence because of their technological advances and growing economies. The increase in oil consumption in these countries causes an increase in oil price as well, thus transforming the structure and boundaries of petro-politics.

6. The Strengthening of Multinational Companies, NGO's and other Regional Actors

As a natural consequence of globalization after the 1980s, multinational enterprises, NGO's and other regional actors with a growing number, have access to power and could have a significant global impact including the EU. In the EU, there are many national political parties, nationwide functional organisations, local and state administrations that play a central role. Even if multinational enterprises are formed and owned by more than one country, in fact, it has been known that almost all of these enterprises mainly provide benefits to several developed countries. International organizations, multinational companies and other entities that affect the EU are built on a liberal philosophy. Motivated and driven by more profits, these multinational corporations cannot endure any kind of failure to protect their own

interests, and will become forces pressuring the EU to transform (Dür and De Bièvre, 2007: 85).

C. Continuation of the EU Enlargement Process

According to the EU's official website, "the EU is open to any European country that is democratic, has a market economy and possesses the administrative capacity to handle the rights and obligations of membership. This means enlargement is an ongoing process" (http://europa.eu/pol/enlarg/index_en.htm).

The deepening of European integration is frequently understood as being opposed to the widening of integration through enlargement of the EU. The meaning and effect of enlargement has been changing since 1973, the date of the first enlargement. For the first years of the European integration, economic matters were the priority while social, political or cultural cooperation were pushed aside or even entirely ignored by the European policy makers. But for today, EU enlargement causes far-reaching changes in different aspects of the EU. The 2004/2007 enlargements, the biggest in the Union's history, had roots in the collapse of communism. It was welcomed that time, but today it is criticized by many who claim to not have fully digested it yet. As Bieler (2003: 9) claims, the enlargement process will go on in an atmosphere of great euphoria. Maybe not in a very short period but eventually the EU will complete its enlargement process.¹² In fact, the most obvious changes in the EU are observed during the period of enlargement because after each expansion of the EU, in order to include the new members in the EU structure and decision-making mechanism, the EU needs to go through administrative and structural changes. Each enlargement provides an advantage but at the same time it also increases the vulnerability of the Community's deepening process. Besides, another disadvantage is that after each enlargement, the member countries' efficiency decreases in comparison to earlier times. Most of this negativity is affecting small and medium sized member states and every day the scope of speech rights within the EU is decreasing for them. Some members are not content with the impression that the EU is governed by the

¹² The EU is now looking at further enlargements in the Western Balkans that would eventually include Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia, Montenegro and Albania. Once all these countries become ready, the number of members may go up to 35.

decisions of only two leaders, Nicolas Sarkozy and Angela Merkel. Especially countries such as Ireland and Portugal will support any effort to change the status quo. Merkel and Sarkozy announced to the public that they agreed at the summit of December 2009 on making some changes to the Lisbon agreement because of deepening problems. The empowerment of those core countries in decision-making has made some scholars think that an embryonic European empire is emerging.

New components can be added to the ones that were mentioned above and the content of analysis may also be expanded but the conclusions would not be too much different. All of the above-mentioned components would create pressure for reform in the EU. From these assumptions, it can be detected that the EU will change, but what is important to understand is how the EU will be.

II. A European Union Proposal for 2050's

The EU of the 2050s will be different from the EU of the 2010s because of the ever changing and the self-renewal nature of the EU. Since its establishment, there have been numerous studies attempting to answer what kind of EU would be in the future but almost none of them seem to coincide with reality and each fails to foresee what would happen in real politics.

The words that Schuman spoke¹³ in 1950 were quite different from former German Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer's¹⁴ speech after nearly half a century and they offered different forms of the EU. Fischer had suggested that the EU should be organized as a European Federation.¹⁵ The future structure of the EU would not fit

¹³Schuman left no doubt in his first words that this was the birth of a New Europe, based on innovative democratic principles. See for full text what Schuman said: The Schuman Declaration of 9 May 1950 (EU official web site: <http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl>).

¹⁴What Fischer said was “Does the answer to the twin challenge of enlargement and deepening, then, lie in such a differentiation, an enhanced cooperation in some areas? Precisely in an enlarged and thus necessarily more heterogeneous Union, further differentiation will be inevitable” (Poole, 2003: 199).

¹⁵Fischer proposed that: Brussels must be donated with legislative and executive mechanisms, not involving any conflict but complement the members. The speech by Joschka Fischer is at the Humboldt University: "From Confederacy to Federation – Thoughts on the finality of European integration" (Berlin, 12 May 2000).

the definitions of federation or confederation and would be a form of a collaboration previously untested.

The transformation will not only change the EU but also member states. According to this approach Keaton states¹⁶ that change should occur in five main areas and must be comprehensive. Furthermore, there has always been a close link between European integration and peace (Diez et.al, 2004: 2).

The EU members, who had fought with each other for centuries, know that they owe the peace, almost nearly 60 year-long, to the EU, therefore they will not give up cooperation under the EU umbrella. Despite getting many profits from the EU, some rich members such as Germany, United Kingdom, Italy and France, having almost no economic problems, with a high level of prosperity, have not resumed their membership only for economical reasons. In other words, EU member countries are aware that their national interests would not be realized without the EU. Small EU member states like Estonia and Latvia have no way to protect their national interests but only in the EU. Some medium-sized countries like Poland, Portugal and Ireland have obtained significant gains from the EU as well. None of the members of the EU will be allowed to collapse. Not only the EU members but also the United States, the dominant actor, will not let the EU disintegrate or weaken gradually in the global sense. The United States will try to retain its power and will support a EU form according to its own interest for this reason. The EU will not collapse, but will change.

Because the changes of the EU are expected to begin in such areas which would be more effective after transformation, the first change may be the most critical dimension of the EU: the decision-making mechanism. Especially for the vital

¹⁶“1. European integration undermines state competences in matters such as market unity and regulation, the currency, and external security. 2. Second, Europe challenges the doctrine of unitary and exclusive state sovereignty, by constituting a legal order, encouraging a legal and constitutional pluralism, in which distinct normative orders coexist. 3. European integration has undermined the old claim that democracy can only function in nationally homogeneous territories, which provide a common identity and trust. 4. Europe, in the form of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights, separates human rights from nationality and citizenship, under-mining state claims to be the bearers of universal rights or the only means to secure them. 5. European transnational regimes, notably but not exclusively the EU, have provided new opportunity structures beyond the state for nationality movements, often in alliance with regions.” (Keating, 2004: 369)

fields to the Community such as foreign policy issues, the existing decision-making mechanism of the EU does not allow to use the existing EU potential. As the EU expects more members to join it (around 35 in the near future), the more sensitivity there is in the EU's decision-making mechanism. That powerful nations of EU want to be *more equal* than others is as natural as mentioned before.

A. Possible Future Positions of EU Members

An inevitable change should provide a structure completely different from today's EU. It can be proposed that, the EU should reorganize as a form of unique structure, composed of five different groups whose members may change at certain times. The proposed structure for the EU is shown in the table below:

Table 1: EU of core and peripheries

Core members		Periphery members		
Inner core members	Outer core members	First periphery members	Second periphery members	Third periphery members
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Germany • France • U. Kingdom 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Italy • Sweden • Austria • Poland • Spain • Netherlands • Greece • Turkey 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Czech. Rep. • Portugal • Hungary • Belgium • Denmark • Finland 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Slovakia • Slovenia • Estonia • Croatia • Latvia • Lithuania • Malta • Cyprus 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • FYROM • Albania • BiH • Montenegro • Serbia • Kosovo
Members that have authority to make all EU common policies, including foreign policy. Members that have veto power on the implementation of all EU common policies including foreign policy.	Members that have authority to make all EU common policies, including foreign policy. Members that have no veto power on the implementation of EU foreign policy. Members that have veto power on the implementation of all EU common policies except foreign policy.	Members that have authority to make all EU common policies, except foreign policy. Members that have veto power on the implementation of all EU common policies except foreign policy.	Members that have authority on making of all EU common policies. Members that have no veto power on the implementation of all EU common policies.	Members that have a say on making of any EU common policies. Members that have no veto power on the implementation of any EU common policies.

- Note:*
1. When determining the zones of members and candidate countries, the factors used as of 2010.
 2. The zones and members of that are not strict and probably would change by time.

In the proposed structure, the distribution of power within the EU will be clearly defined and the efficiency of the EU member states will vary according to the groups to which they belong. The categorisation of core and periphery countries is made mainly based on their population.¹⁷

1. *Core members*

The first two groups should be composed of the dominant members. Inner core ones of core members should have authority to make all EU common policies, including foreign policy, and should have veto power on the implementation of all EU decisions of common policies including foreign policy like the UN Security Council permanent members. Unlike inner ones, outer core members lack veto power on foreign policy.

2. *Periphery members*

Periphery members consist of three zones around the core members.

- a. *First Periphery members:* members of that group have authority to make all EU common policies, except foreign policy and have veto power on the implementation of all EU common policies, except foreign policy.
- b. *Second Periphery members:* while they do have authority to make all EU common policies, they do not have veto power on the implementations of all EU common policies.
- c. *Third Periphery members:* members in this zone have no authority nor veto power on making and the implementation of EU common policies. Some countries that have no option but to join the EU would be members of this zone. Their aim is to get benefits from EU's potential, and their relation with the EU looks like privileged partnership.

¹⁷The reason of this choice lies in the nature of the Lisbon Treaty which delivers the power by considering only member countries' population among all factors, unlike the other agreements such as Nice Treaty, which takes into account the political and economic powers of countries as well.

One of the most prominent features of the proposed structure is that the position of countries in zones is not permanent and can vary depending on the conditions. But it does not mean that horizontal displacements will be easy; for example, in a short time such as 10 years perhaps, the displacement limit would be one zone moving. In other words, it is almost not possible for a country in the outer core, to deploy to the second periphery. An example of this could be Belgium, one of the six founders of the EU. In the proposed model, Belgium should take place among the first periphery nations. But in case of political dispersing in future as different three states, new ones may deploy to the third periphery. Similar to that, Central and Eastern European countries after getting membership status and many of former members would displace to new zones.

Although the suggested structure looks similar to the previously developed models, Variable Geometry Europe (Grant, 2005) and Europe of Concentric Circles show certain differences (Alesina and Grilli, 1993: 285). While Germany offered certain positions for members, the proposed structure lets the members deploy depending on their power change. Frenchmen offer variable places in Concentric Circles (Thurner and Binder, 2009: 93) members move from zone to zone according to their integration level and capacity. But in the proposed structure, the only factor that determines the zones is the members' power composed of their economy, demography, military, geography etc.

B. Structural and Institutional Transformation

Zones will have been vested with powers to govern the EU. The most distinctive difference of the proposed model from similar ones is giving rights to say something or to have an ability to block any kind of decision in the name of the EU. The members' powers decrease while going from core to peripheries.

1. Social Structure

Contrary to common belief, the change will be not only in the political structures of member countries, but also in social structures. Almost all of the community members' common demographic features (aging population and a decreasing population number) can have some effects on the political efficiency within the EU.

The decreasing and aging populations of some members such as Denmark, Finland, Greece and Belgium, which are considerably effective at the present time, would become disadvantageous at a later time. Some members such as Italy, Sweden, Austria, and the Netherlands have almost the same powers to govern the EU as Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In this case these countries would not maintain their efficiency within the EU due to their demographic problems. But Turkey, if it manages to be a member, and Poland, would be promoted to a powerful position compared to others. Beside all these, there is a constant migration to Europe and so far the policies that have been developed by the EU cannot prevent migration. The increasing life expectancy coupled with declining birth rates, can cause in the near future many social issues¹⁸. The most distinctive one among those is that the number of foreigners might surpass that of the natives. According to Bieler (2003), European politics/integration is an open-ended process the outcome of which is the result of class struggle.

2. Economic Structure

Social changes have another dimension, adversely affecting the economy. This negative effect of increasing social security expenses is a pressure on economies of the EU members. Depending on these effects, some EU members may not maintain the same level of social welfare due social security budget deficits.

Changes will not occur only in the position of EU members but at the same time in the EU institutions:

3. The European Parliament

Although the powers of the EP are gradually increasing in the EU because of the EU leaders' attitudes, who hold onto and do not want to delegate legislative authority, it does not seem that the EU, having almost no legislative power, is likely to become a more competent institution in the near future. It is certain that there will not be any remarkable change to the mission of the EP. However, a new regulation will be needed regarding the number of seats of each member. In this arrangement,

¹⁸In the past decades social expenditure as a percentage of GDP has risen considerably in Member States such as Italy, Portugal, and Spain (Kees, 2005: 362).

especially the inner core countries, and some outer and first periphery ones will put pressure to increase the number of parliamentarians to the second and third periphery countries consistently. The EP President will be selected among the core countries' parliamentarians in an alternating manner or at least nominated by the inner core of countries. Inner and outer core countries will predominantly take place in sub-commissions of the EP (Schuck, 2010: 1-12).

4. The EU Commission

The Commission's mission may not need to have very important changes. However, the president of the Commission and critical commissioners, foreign policy, enlargement etc. will be named from inner core countries. Besides that, the distribution system of the EU Commissioners would be similar to the system applied while Commission had 15 members, from inner and outer core countries.

5. The EU Council

Radical changes in the distribution of votes in the Council seem very probable. This change may be in favour of the inner and outer core members. Inner members of core countries will want to have a say in the formation of all policies including foreign policy. Inner core countries will want to have the right to veto during the implementation of all policies including foreign policy, similar to the veto power of UN Security Council permanent members. Outer core countries, like inner ones, will want to have a say in all policies including foreign policy, but they will not have veto power to stop any foreign policy implementations like inner core countries. For those countries, veto power can be given in the implementation of common policies except foreign policy. First, second and third periphery countries may have less authority according to the inner and outer cores in the decision-making.

6. Other EU Institutions, Bodies, Policies, Activities

Structural reforms can be made to other EU institutions that may be affected by any possible changes in the balance of power and in favour of more powerful countries. Accordingly, some changes will be seen in other EU policies, activities and bodies, such as its budget, monetary issues, etc.

7. *EU Decision-Making Mechanism*

As mentioned partly above already, the efficiency of member states in the EU decision-making will change, but there is another dimension of that in which the people of the EU do not participate. Although the Europeans have chosen their parliamentarians, since the EP has no word in decision-making, this is the most criticized and makes the EU democracy deficient.¹⁹

Because core countries, Germany, France, United Kingdom, and others have the tendency to not leave but to increase even further their current status of authority in the EU, it seems in the new proposed structure that there will be no remarkable change to the decision-making mechanism.

III. Contribution of Turkey to the Future of the EU

As the EU is under pressure from many different dimensions of globalization, the importance of Turkey's membership is growing. Some data expressed as a percentage may give an idea about Turkey's contribution to the EU. The 2004 enlargement, so far, is the most comprehensive experience, covering 10 members and expanding the EU from 15 to 25 members.

While with this most comprehensive expansion, the EU increased its area by 23% and its population by 20%, and after the accession of Bulgaria and Romania, the EU's area increased by 9% and its population by 6%. But only with the participation of Turkey, the EU's area will increase by 28% and its population by 15%. Turkey's contribution to the EU is not being expressed only in numerical value.

After Turkey's accession, the creation of a universal Europe, free from the influence of a single religion, will be provided. The young population of Turkey will be able to cure the EU's growing demographic problems. In regards to the EU's problem with having a secure energy supply, Turkey is the key because of its strategic

¹⁹ "The rather imprecise term '*democratic deficit*' covers diverse issues such as the lack of democratic anchorage of EU institutions and decisions and the gap between policy-makers and citizens" (Enjolras, 2008: 496).

location²⁰ between Europe and the region that has more than 75 % of the world's fossil resources. The only way for Europe to get rid of the disquiet²¹ of the Middle Ages, following Europe like a shadow is Turkey's accession, which has a large number of Muslims. Turkey, influential within the region, can contribute to prevent unfavourable developments in the Balkans that have disturbed the EU in the past. Turkey with a significant military power will provide a unique solution for the EU, which has not established a military power²² at the expected level yet. Turkey's full membership will also terminate the civilization and religion-based discussions. The EU, which is trying to create a security community in its immediate vicinity through the Neighbourhood Policy, Turkey's membership will prove the sincerity of the EU on this zone. Turkey's influence in the cases of the Iran nuclear crisis and Syria's relations with the West illustrates the future contribution of Turkey to the EU's common foreign policy.

Moreover, also in the global competition, a noteworthy advantage is possible only with Turkey, which brings an advantage by virtue of the size of its market. Turkey will give the EU an ability to cope with the United States whenever a conflict of interest is experienced and the EU will be more effective in the Middle East and the Central Asia region due to Turkey's contribution. The EU can be a global actor only after Turkey is a member of it.

²⁰ The geopolitical issues are obvious: continuing instability in the Middle East; the fact that Turkey sits astride the route to the oil-rich lands of central Asia; the awkward relationship with Russia (Laming, 2009).

²¹ Is Europe still Christian? Can a Muslim country really be part of the European family? The issue of Turkey is inseparable from this wider, deeper question. More to the point, though, the question of the relationship between Islam and Europe has to be answered anyway, whether or not we are thinking about Turkey and the EU. Many European countries now have substantial or growing Muslim minorities and adapting to their presence is going to be one of the central issues of European politics. While most European democracies think of themselves as broadly secular, in fact they are probably better described as post-Christian. Their assumptions and rhythms still betray their origins: they are not at an equal distance from all the faith groups they contain. See: (Laming, 2009).

²² For details of European Army, see: (King, 2005).

Conclusion

With the Treaty of Lisbon, the EU decision makers could not set up a structure that could cope with the EU's global and obstinate problems. The only profit obtained from the Treaty of Lisbon was postponing dealing with problems for a later date. But change is inevitable for the EU. If the EU will not change, it will face an obligation to turn into a regional organization, a little more than a simple economic cooperation platform. In order for the EU to get rid of this negativity there is only one way that it must go and that is transformation. For this transformation, a ring-shaped structure can be proposed. The proposed unique structure for the EU is to be composed of five different groups as core and periphery. Those members may change at certain times. To complete the transformation with success, Turkey must be within the EU transformation. It is essential to include Turkey in the core zone. As mentioned in the study, the only way to cope with the problems and become a global actor is Turkey's accession into the EU.

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